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Over the past several years, United States immigration law has under-
gone a significant metamorphosis. Reform measures have been intro-
duced that have substantially altered this country's approach to
governing its borders. Foremost among these is the watershed "legaliza-
tion" or "amnesty" provision of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 ("IRCA"),l the product of one of the longest and most ardu-
ous legislative undertakings in recent history. IRCA legalization grants
lawful resident status to illegal aliens who have been continuously and
illegally present in the United States since January 1, 1982.2 Although
bound up in a larger, more conservative legislative effort to restrict illegalimmigration, the provision is designed in significant part to acknowledge
a deserving class of undocumented aliens.3 This humanitarian focus
'marks a radical departure from traditional immigration policy, and
makes legalization an innovative and salutary development. Neverthe-
less, another reform measure introduced during this period, the rule de-
nying immigrant admission to aliens who test positive for the human
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"),4 threatens to prevent the realization of
the legalization provision's humanitarian goals.
This Comment analyzes the impact that the HIV exclusion will have
on the successful implementation of the IRCA legalization provision.
t J.D. candidate, 1990, University of Virginia School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor David A. Martin for his assistance in writing this Comment.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 20, 29,
& 42 U.S.C.). IRCA is an amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
("INA"), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)).
2. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
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Part one discusses the objectives underlying the Act itself, and how these
objectives are to be effectuated through the interrelated employer sanc-
tions and legalization schemes. An essential element of this discussion
will be an examination of the specific goals of legalization, in order to
demonstrate the special humanitarian concerns addressed therein. Part
two reviews in some detail the terms of the legalization provision itself,
including eligibility, evidentiary requirements, and application proce-
dures. Part three provides a brief overview of the medical knowledge
regarding AIDS, HIV, and the relationship between the two. Part four
traces the adoption of HIV as a condition of exclusion, noting the hasty
and perhaps incomplete process with which it was effected. Part five at-
tempts to assess the full extent of the harm that the exclusion rule will
bring upon legalization, in terms of the number of potential amnesty ap-
plicants whose lives will be drastically altered.: This section will also dis-
count Congress' assumption that the availability of a waiver of
excludability will mitigate any deleterious effects that the HIV exclusion
might produce. Part six introduces several arguments against the exclu-
sion rule, which fall generally into two lines of reasoning: first, that it is
antithetical to the intent underlying legalization; and second, that it will
prove ineffective at fighting the spread of AIDS in this country. Given
these arguments, the Comment concludes in part seven by recom-
mending that Congress re-evaluate the wisdom of the HIV exclusion,
particularly as applied to the legalization context.
I. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
A. Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration So That the Front
Door May Remain Open
On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed IRCA into law, cul-
minating a fifteen year effort to reform United States immigration pol-
icy.5 Representing "a delicate balance between widely divergent views
5. Leiden, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Introduction and Legislative
Overview, 9 IMMIGR. J. 1 (1986). The genesis of this campaign can be traced back to 1971,
when dissatisfaction with the state of contemporary immigration law prompted extensive legis-
lative activity on the problem of undocumented aliens, and led the 92d House Judiciary Com-
mittee to conclude that "the adverse impact of illegal aliens was substantial, and warranted
legislation both to protect U.S. labor and the economy, and to assure the orderly entry of
immigrants into this country." H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). This
activity formed the basis for a series of bills prohibiting the knowing employment of undocu-
mented aliens and establishing penalties for employers who violate the prohibition. The ra-
tionale for this approach was explained by the House Judiciary Committee during the 94th
Congress: "[T]he most reasonable approach to this problem is to make unlawful the 'knowing'
employment of illegal aliens, thereby removing the economic incentive which draws such
aliens to the United States as well as the incentive for employers to exploit this source of
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and interests,"' 6 the Act is designed to "close the back door on illegal
immigration" by introducing new initiatives to curtail this phenomenon.7
At the same time, however, it attempts to open "the front door on legal
immigration ' 8 slightly more by making limited changes in the current
system governing the entry of foreign nationals into the country. Consis-
tent with these objectives, the centerpiece of the legislation is a pair of
linked provisions calling for: "(1) sanctions against employers that hire
unauthorized alien workers; and (2) legalization of certain undocu-
labor." Id. at 6. Hence, from the outset of the modem reform movement, employer sanctions
were embraced as the most effective remedy for the problem of undocumented aliens. Indeed,
sanctions were the central component of every legislative scheme introduced between 1972 and
1986. H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1983).
While modem notions of immigration reform have consistently been predicated on the con-
cept of employer sanctions, legalization has also been recognized as an essential element of a
revised immigration policy. In 1975, a new version of the earlier illegal alien bills was intro-
duced in both the House and Senate which included, in addition to employer sanctions, an
amnesty program allowing for the regularization of status of certain undocumented aliens. Id.
In addition, legalization was included among the recommendations of special task forces estab-
lished by the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations to evaluate immigration reform alter-
natives. Id. at 39-40.
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, a blue ribbon panel charged
with studying United States immigration laws and suggesting effective measures to control the
country's borders, provided in its 1981 report for an amnesty program, once a system of em-
ployer sanctions and other enforcement initiatives had been introduced. S. REP. No. 62, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1975). See also Leiden, supra, at 9. Finally, the "Simpson-Mazzoli" immi-
gration reform bills of 1982 and 1983, which established the blueprint for what was to become
IRCA, encompassed most of the Select Committee's recommendations, including the legaliza-
tion provision. Newton & Landman, Immigration Law: Reform for the Sake of Reform - The
Immigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986, 7 ST. Louis U. Pun. L. REv. 433, 440 (1988).
Unlike employer sanctions, however, amnesty did not meet with uniform acceptance. On
the contrary, legalization was the topic of intense, protracted legislative controversy. Many
members of Congress found it paradoxical to adopt a policy granting legal status to resident
illegal aliens while at the same time supporting efforts to severely restrict legal immigration.
For example, Senator John East fought the legalization provisions of the Simpson-Rodino bills
of 1982 and 1983, arguing:
Mass amnesty would undercut enforcement of our laws and contribute to future illegal
immigration. By rewarding and protecting foreigners who have intentionally violated the
criminal law of this nation, Congress would be perceived by many citizens as abetting law
breaking and failing to uphold and defend the law of the land.
S. REP. No. 62, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1983) (minority views of Senator East).
These legislators vehemently opposed the inclusion of amnesty provisions in prospective
legislation. Yet despite this opposition, amnesty was consistently viewed by the majority as a
pragmatic, equitable solution to the problems that a resident illegal alien population presented
to immigration reform. Thus, amnesty has been incorporated into every major proposal for
revising immigration law and policy submitted to Congress since 1975. H.R. REP. No. 115,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1983). Notwithstanding a certain level of Congressional antipa-
thy, then, legalization has traditionally been regarded as both a necessary and significant in-
strument of immigration reform.
6. Mazzoli, Immigration Reform: The Path to Passage and Beyond, 14 J. LEGIS. 41, 42
(1987).
7. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5650.
8. Id.
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mented aliens who have been continuously present in the United States
since January 1, 1982." 9 The following is a brief analysis of these
provisions.
B. Employer Sanctions
The primary purpose of IRCA is to reduce the influx of illegal immi-
gration to the United States, 10 and the mechanism for effecting this re-
duction is a system of employer sanctions.'I The Act makes it illegal for
any employer to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee, an unauthor-
ized alien.' 2 It also proscribes the continued employment .of such a
worker upon discovery that he is an unauthorized alien.13 Employers
who violate these prohibitions are subject to civil and criminal penalties,
the imposition of which are to be governed by an elaborate set of admin-
istrative procedures.14
The employer sanctions provision was predicated on Congress' conclu-
sion that the lure of American jobs was a "magnet" enticing aliens to
enter the United States labor force illegally.15 The presence of vast num-
bers of illegal aliens in turn generated problems such as worker exploita-
tion, reduced wages, and depressed working conditions.16 In
implementing legislation that penalizes employers who hire undocu-
mented aliens, therefore, Congress sought to remove the incentive for
illegal immigration by eliminating the employment opportunities that
draw aliens into this country in the first place."7
C. Legalization
In addition to employer sanctions, IRCA contains a provision author-
izing the legalization of certain undocumented aliens who have resided
9. Fragomen, Del Rey & Bernsen, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 5
IMMIGR. L. REP. 73 (1986).
10. "[T]he first element of immigration reform was to eliminate the illegal flow of aliens."
Mazzoli, supra note 6, at 42.
11. "The employer sanctions program is the keystone and major element." Statement by
President Ronald Reagan (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in N. MONTWEILER, THE IMMIGRATION
REFORM LAW OF 1986 539 (1987).
12. INA § 274a(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (1988).
13. INA § 274a(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (1988).
14. Fragomen, Del Rey & Bernsen, supra note 9, at 74.
15. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5650.
16. See Mazzoli, supra note 6, at 42.
17. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5650.
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continuously in this country since before January 1, 1982.18 This initia-
tive was prompted by two concerns: practicality and humane treatment.
Regarding practicality, Congress realized that the large population of
undocumented aliens currently living in the United States posed a serious
threat to its efforts to control illegal immigration thr6ugh employer sanc-
tions. The legislative scheme for a revitalized, sanctions-oriented en-
forcement program depended upon the removal of these aliens in order
to provide the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") with a
clean slate on which to proceed. Congress also recognized, however, that
actual physical removal would be economically and logistically untena-
ble, since mass deportations or intensified interior enforcement "would
be costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage."' 19
In this light, legalization appeared to be the only viable option. By
according legg status to certain qualified aliens, Congress would effec-
tively "remove" these individuals, and in so doing "[free the] INS to tar-
get its enforcement efforts on stopping new flows of undocumented
[foreigners]." 20 Thus, the primary purpose of the amnesty program was
to promote the objective of employer sanctions, or, more specifically, to
stem the flow of illegal aliens into this country. But since, as Congress-
man Romano Mazzoli observed, "[y]ou can't just boot . . . out"2 1 the
existing population of resident aliens, this objective had to be realized
through an effective, "one-time legalization program. 22
Regarding humane treatment, a second purpose underlying the am-
nesty provision was to grant legal status to a "shadow population" of
undocumented workers who had proven themselves worthy of formal
recognition.2 3 Congress acknowledged the fact that these individuals had
lived in the United States for a significant period of time and, by their
economic and social contributions, had demonstrated their value to the
18. INA § 245A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1988). See also Newton & Landman, supra
note 5, at 437.
19. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653. As Congressman Dan Lungren noted, "[t]he United
States simply lacks the machinery to deport millions of people." H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5750.
20. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
21. House Agrees to Amnesty, Houston Post, June 21, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
22. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
23. In outlining the Reagan Administration's position on immigration reform, Attorney
General Edwin Meese III stated, "[w]e have to deal realistically with people whose longstand-
ing presence here has demonstrated an abiding commitment to this country as productive and
law abiding residents." Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings on H.R.
3080 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99 Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977) (statement of Edwin
Meese III).
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country.24 Yet despite their positive impact, many of these people were
forced by their illegal status to live clandestine lives, subject to the ex-
ploitation of employers, landlords, and criminals. 25 Legalization was
thus designed to bring this population out of hiding and provide them
"access to many of the benefits of a free and open society."' 26
To accomplish this goal, Congress mandated that the amnesty pro-
gram "be implemented in a liberal and generous fashion."' 27 Recognizing
that exceedingly "rigid demands for proof of eligibility ... could seri-
ously impede the success of the legalization effort," the legislature in-
structed the INS to maintain flexible standards of qualification to ensure
the highest level of participation. 28 In this vein, the agency was in-
structed to "tak[e] into consideration the special circumstances relating
to" an applicant when making an assessment of qualification. 29 Thus, by
liberally granting legal status to long term illegal aliens, Congress satis-
fied the dual objectives of the legalization program: ensuring that am-
nesty would be an isolated, sweeping measure clearing the way for more
effective enforcement of illegal immigration; and recognizing that years
of residence and employment in the United States imply membership in
the community and an entitlement to remain in the country.30
II. Examination of the Legalization Provision of IRCA
IRCA added § 245A to the INA providing for the legalization of cer-
tain aliens who have been continuously present in the United States in
24. "Many have strong family ties here which include U.S. citizens and lawful residents.
They have built social networks in this country. They have contributed to the United States in
myriad ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars." H.R. REP. No. 682,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
25. Id. See also Stine, Out of the Shadows: Defining "Known to the Government" in the
Immigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 641, 642 (1988).
26. Statement of President Reagan (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in N. MONTWEILER, supra
note 11, at 539.
27. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5677.
Despite the language contained in the House Committee Report, it is somewhat misleading
to state that "Congress" as a whole advocated the flexible implementation of the legalization
scheme. In fact, there was some variance in the respective positions that both houses of the
legislature assumed regarding the scope of amnesty. The Senate was far more restrictive in
orientation, and thus sought to effectuate a conservative, less-sweeping plan. Furthermore,
although the House officially adopted the liberal approach outlined above, there was neverthe-
less a significant amount of opposition to the legalization provision within that body, which
caused IRCA to pass by a much narrower margin than it would have otherwise.
28. Id. at 73, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5677.
29. Id.
30. Recent Developments - Immigration Law: Reform of United States Immigration Law,
28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 490 (1987).
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unlawful status since before January 1, 1982.31 Generally speaking, this
section applies to two categories of aliens: (1) those who entered the
country illegally before January 1, 1982 and who have been continuously
and unlawfully residing here since; and (2) those who entered as legal
nonimmigrants, fell out of legitimate status prior to January 1, 1982, but
nevertheless have been continuously and illegally present since that
time.32 An individual falling within either of these broad classifications
can qualify for special status as a temporary legal resident of the United
States.
To be eligible for adjustment to temporary resident status, an alien
must have filed an application with the INS or some qualified designated
entity within a one-year period beginning May 5, 1987 and ending May
4, 1988. 33 The application must demonstrate eligibility on two main
grounds: (1) a general evidentiary standard; and (2) a requirement that
the applicant be admissible as an immigrant. With respect to the eviden-
tiary standard, the applicant must submit documentation establishing
proof of identity, continuous unlawful residence, and financial responsi-
bility, as well as photographs, a fingerprint card, and a medical examina-
tion report.34 This evidence is designed to assist the INS in determining
whether an applicant has the requisite unlawful immigration status for
the purpose of granting amnesty, and whether he or she has met the
conditions for continuous residence.35 The information that the INS re-
ceives in the application is deemed confidential, and as such cannot be
used as a foundation for subsequent deportation proceedings. 36 Rather,
evidence can be utilized only to adjudicate legalization and to prosecute
criminal fraud. 37 Eligibility for legalization must be demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence.3 8
31. INA § 245A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988). In addition to the general legalization
provision, the Act also creates three other schemes under which certain groups of aliens can
qualify for amnesty: (1) a special adjustment of status provision for Cuban-Haitian entrants
(INA § 202); (2) a provision conferring temporary resident status on certain seasonal agricul-
tural workers (INA § 302); and (3) an amendment to the registry provision of INA § 249
changing the date for illegal residence from June 30, 1948 to January 1, 1972 (INA § 203).
32. INA § 245A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988).
33. There are some exceptions to this deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 (1989).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d) (1989).
35. For the purposes of IRCA, an applicant for temporary resident status is regarded as
having resided continuously in the United States if, at the time of filing the application: (1) no
single absence from the United States exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences did
not exceed 180 days between January 1, 1982 and the filing date; (2) the alien was maintaining
a residence in the United States; and (3) the alien's departure was not based on a deportation
order. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(c)(1) (1989).
36. INA § 245A(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988).
37. Id.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) (1989).
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In addition to the evidentiary requirements, an applicant must be ad-
missible as an immigrant. INA § 212(a) delineates thirty-three condi-
tions of excludability which prohibit an alien from entering the United
States. 39 IRCA incorporates this general rule, thereby establishing a
threshold level of admissibility which all prospective beneficiaries of le-
galization must overcome. Nevertheless, the Act alters the impact of
these grounds of exclusion in three distinct ways. First, it holds that
some grounds simply do not pertain to applicants for legalization.4° Sec-
ond, it retains some grounds and precludes the possibility of their being
waived. 41 Finally, the Act provides for a special waiver, subject to the
discretionary authority of the Attorney General, which permits an appli-
cant who is otherwise excludable to obtain adjustment of status upon
proof of certain extenuating circumstances. 42 These special circum-
stances include humanitarian purposes, assuring family unity, and serv-
ing the public interest.43
IRCA also contains a medical examination requirement that bears
heavily on the question of admissibility. 44 According to this provision,
all applicants for regularization of status must submit to an examination
by a designated civil surgeon.45 The examination is conducted in accord-
ance with specific administrative regulations. 46 The purpose of this re-
quirement is both to satisfy quarantine standards and to determine
admissibility under INA § 212.47
Currently, § 212(a) lists seven medical grounds for the exclusion of
aliens.48 An applicant whose medical report indicates that she falls
39. INA § 212(a)(1)-(33), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (1988).
40. The grounds of exclusion that relate to documentary requirements, such as the neces-
sity for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, are waived. These include § 212(a)(20) and
§ 212(a)(21). INA § 245A(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2) (1988).
41. These grounds are codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a): (9) (the commission of crimes of
moral turpitude); (10) (conviction of two or more crimes with an aggregate sentence of five
years); (15) (likely to become a public charge); (23) (crimes involving narcotics); (27) (risks to
national security); (28) (communist affiliations); (29) (threat of espionage or sabotage); and
(33) (involvement in Nazi persecution).
42. INA § 245A(d)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k) (1988).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1161(e)(2)(A) (1988).
44. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(i) (1989).
45. Id.
46. These regulations instruct the examiner to evaluate and report on certain aspects of the
applicant's physical and mental health, as well as his immunization status. See Comment, Re-
evaluating Alien Exclusion in Light ofAIDS, 6 DICK. J. INT'L L. 119, 125 (1987). The scope of
the medical examination requirements for aliens seeking admission to the United States is
outlined in 42 C.F.R. § 34 (1988).
47. Comment, supra note 46, at 125.
48. The first five grounds pertain to certain medical conditions, narcotic drug addiction,
and chronic alcoholism. The sixth ground calls for the exclusion of aliens who are suffering
from a dangerous contagious disease. The seventh ground refers to any physical condition that
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within any one of these enumerated conditions is therefore designated
inadmissible, barring proof justifying a special waiver. In this respect,
then, the medical examination provision plays an important role in the
determination of eligibility for legalization.
Upon proof of eligibility, an applicant is accorded status as a tempo-
rary resident.4 9 The benefits of this designation include entitlement to
work authorization, as well as limited permission to travel abroad.50
Furthermore, after a period of eighteen months as a temporary resident,
the applicant can file for adjustment to permanent resident status. 51 An
award of permanent status qualifies an alien to apply in due course for
United States citizenship.
III. AIDS and Its Relationship to HIV52
AIDS is a viral disease characterized by a breakdown in the body's
immune system.53 The disease is caused by HIV,54 which inhibits the
ability to resist illness by attacking the very core of the body's defenses.55
Specifically, the virus targets "T4 helper cells," which help both to distin-
guish between normal body cells and disease organisms and to determine
the appropriate level of response. 56 By identifying, infecting, and killing
T4 helper cells, HIV progressively weakens the immune system, render-
would prevent an alien from earning a living. INA § 212(a)(1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(7)
(1988).
49. INA § 245A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1988).
50. INA § 245A(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(b)(3) (1988).
51. Id. To qualify for permanent status the applicant must again prove continuous resi-
dence (this time, since admission as a temporary resident) and admissibility as an immigrant
under INA § 212(a) (including passing a second medical examination if she filed for amnesty
before the HIV exclusion went into effect (see infra note 102 and accompanying text)). Id. In
addition, the applicant must demonstrate certain basic citizenship skills. Id.
52. A comprehensive review of the medical knowledge regarding AIDS and HIV is beyond
the scope of this Comment. This section is designed merely to provide the reader with a
general understanding of the nature of the disease, and to highlight certain facts which figure
significantly into an evaluation of the desirability of the HIV exclusion. For more detailed
information on AIDS and HIV, see, eg., Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik & Dondero,
Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 ScL. 610 (1988); Francis &
Chin, The Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States, 257 J. AM.
MED. A. 1357 (1987); Gostin, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: A Review of Science,
Health, Policy & Law, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 4 (1986); Laurence, The Immune System and
AIDS, 253 Sci. AM. 84 (1985); Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 250 (1986).
53. See Laurence, supra note 52, at 88; Comment, supra note 46, at 126.
54. HIV is also known as T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III) or lymphadenopathy-
associated virus (LAV). Laurence, supra note 52, at 84; Francis & Chin, supra note 52, at 1357
& nn.4-6.
55. Laurence, supra note 52, at 88.
56. Foreman, Focus on AIDS: AIDS and the Third World, 1 PANOSCOPE 4 (1987).
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ing its victims susceptible to diseases that do not normally afflict healthy
people.57
Each period in the development of HIV is characterized by different
symptoms and illnesses.58 AIDS marks the final stage in this process, at
which point the immune system has virtually collapsed and opportunistic
diseases enter the body.59 To date, AIDS is both incurable and fatal.60
Few of its victims live longer than three or four years.61
The HIV virus can be transmitted in the following ways: sexual con-
tact involving the exchange of body fluids; the sharing of contaminated
needles by intravenous drug users; transfusions of tainted blood and
blood products; and the transplacental passing of the virus from an in-
fected mother to her unborn fetus.62 Once infection has occurred, the
system responds by producing HIV antibodies.63 Tests to detect the
presence of these antibodies are the standard way to discover whether an
individual has been exposed to HIV.64 An individual with a repeatedly
reactive antibody test, an "HIV-positive" or "seropositive," is presumed
to be infected with the virus and capable of spreading it to others. 65
HIV-positive blood tests, however, do not indicate that their subjects
have AIDS.66 They merely indicate that the subjects have been exposed
to the HIV virus, and that their bodies are grappling with its damaging
effects. 67 Not everyone who has been exposed to HIV will develop
AIDS. 68 Some people may be carriers, asymptomatic although capable
of transmitting the virus. 69 Still others may develop AIDS-related com-
57. Id.
58. See Laurence, supra note 52, at 84-88.
59. Id.
60. See D. JAYASURIA, AIDS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS 3 (1988); Os-
born, The AIDS Epidemic: An Overview of the Science, 2 IssuEs ScI. & TECH. 40, 43 (1986).
61. See supra note 60; see also Harsburgh, Douglas & LaFrance, Preventative Strategies in
Sexually Transmitted Diseases for the Primary Care Physician, 258 . AM. MED. A. 815, 818
(1987).
62. Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention and Control of Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PuB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985) [hereinafter Public Health Ser-
vice Plan]; Centers for Disease Control, Additional Recommendations to Reduce Sexual and
Drug-Abuse Related Transmission of T-lymphotropic Virus Type II/Lymphadenopathy-Associ-
ated Virus, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 152, 154 (1986).
63. See, e.g., Francis & Chin, supra note 52, at 1357.
64. See, e.g., Screening Donated Blood and Plasma for HLTV-III Antibody, 312 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1186 (1985) [hereinafter Screening Donated Blood]; Gostin, supra note 52, at 5.
65. See Public Health Service Plan, supra note 62, at 453.
66. See id.; Sicklick & Rubinstein, A Medical Review of AIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 9
(1985).
67. Foreman, supra note 56, at 4; Sicklick & Rubinstein, supra note 66, at 9.
68. AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 34 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & Yale
AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
69. See Public Health Service Plan, supra note 62, at 453. See also Feorino, Jaffe, Palmer,
Peterman, Francis, Kalyanaraman, Weinstein, Stoneburner, Alexander, Raevsky, Getchell,
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plex ("ARC"),70 which might not necessarily progress to full-blown
AIDS.71 Since it takes a very long time before the symptoms of AIDS
are produced,72 it is not yet clear what proportion of HIV-positive indi-
viduals will ultimately die of AIDS.73 At this juncture, however, there
are more people known to have been exposed to the virus than who have
been diagnosed with AIDS.74
IV. Excludability in Light of AIDS
As the medical exclusion grounds of INA § 212(a) reflect,75 a signifi-
cant platform of United States immigration policy has been the refusal to
permit entry to aliens afflicted with certain "undesirable" infirmities or
disabilities.76 The emergence of AIDS and its devastating impact on the
global health scene have led to the adoption of certain administrative and
legislative initiatives which both reinforce and augment this position.
INA § 212(a)(6) provides for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with any
"dangerous contagious disease."'77 By 1986, the Public Health Service 78
("PHS") had identified seven diseases as falling within the ambit of this
phrase, including infectious syphilis, gonorrhea, active tuberculosis, and
Warfield, Haverkos, Kilbourne, Nicholson & Curran, Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1293, 1295 (1985); Screening Donated Blood,
supra note 64, at 1187.
70. Persons afflicted with ARC manifest some signs of AIDS but do not have a diagnosed
secondary opportunistic infection. Gostin, supra note 52, at 4.
71. Foreman, supra note 56, at 4. Recently, however, the Centers for Disease Control has
proposed expanding its definition of AIDS to include seropositivity without opportunistic in-
fection. Such definition would cover ARC as well. See Wider AIDS Definition Proposed In
Move to Expand U.S. Benefits, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, at A18, col. 4.
72. The latency period between viral infection and the appearance of AIDS symptoms
ranges from six months to seven years or even longer. Comment, supra note 46, at 128.
73. See Harsburgh, Douglas & LaFrance, supra note 61, at 818; AIDS in the Future: Ex-
perts Say Deaths Will Climb Sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at Cl (Science Times), col. 4.
For example, one source suggests that only 20% of homosexual men with HIV will develop
full-blown AIDS, although another 25% of homosexual men will develop lesser disease states.
Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE
FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 68, at 23-24. See also Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik &
Dondero, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 Sci. 610, 615
(1988) (citing study finding that 88 months after infection, 36% of subjects had developed
AIDS, another group of over 40% had other signs of infection, and only 20% were completely
asymptomatic); Eyster, Gail, Ballard, AI-Mondhiry and Goedhart, Natural History of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Hemophiliacs: Effects of T-Cell Subsets, Platelet Counts,
and Age, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1, 3 (1987) (using Kaplan-Meier survival curve tech-
nique to estimate percentage of adult hemophiliacs who will develop AIDS).
74. Public Health Service Plan, supra note 62, at 453.
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
76. ABA Coordinating Committee on AIDS, AIDS: The Legal Issues 1, 237 (Discussion
Draft 1988) [hereinafter AIDS: The Legal Issues].
77. INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (1988).
78. The Public Health Service is the agency charged with defining "dangerous contagious
diseases" under INA § 212(a)(6).
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leprosy.79 On April 23, 1986, Dr. Otis Bowen, Secretary of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") proposed that the PHS add AIDS to the list of
"dangerous contagious diseases."' 80 Bowen considered it anomalous to
maintain several forms of venereal diseases as bases for exclusion and yet
omit a disease like AIDS, which has grave implications. 81 A Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was thus filed to begin the process of formally
amending the PHS regulations.82 HHS solicited commentary on the pro-
spective change from over seventy-five sources,83 including many groups
advocating the rights of alien immigrants. Despite a great deal of nega-
tive response, the agency on June 8, 1987 instituted a rule adding AIDS
to the INA § 212(a)(6) grounds for inadmissibility. 84 This action was
sanctioned by President Reagan, who on May 31, 1987 announced his
intention to have all immigrants to the United States screened by order-
ing HHS to finalize its proposed rule. Indeed, the President took this
position despite admonitions against doing so from his own Surgeon
General, C. Everett Koop.85 This modification of the conditions for ex-
clusion had a direct effect on the process of legalization under IRCA.86
On July 6, 1987, the INS issued instructions requiring that all medical
examinations conducted for immigration purposes conform to the newly
revised PHS guidelines.87 At that point, though, routine HIV-antibody
testing was not required. The instructions mandated that only those am-
nesty applicants manifesting clinical symptoms of AIDS were to be re-
ferred for confirmatory blood tests.88
On June 2, however, before the PHS had issued its final rule, the Sen-
ate approved an amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1987,89 adding HIV to the list of "dangerous contagious diseases." This
79. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
80. Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS), 51 Fed. Reg. 15,354 (1986) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(8) (proposed Apr. 23, 1986)).
81. Id. at 15, 355.
82. Comment, supra note 46, at 121.
83. Opponents of the proposed rule feared that the INS could discriminate against certain
high risk groups through inappropriate referrals for medical exams. Id. Additionally, oppo-
nents feared that the proposals "did not reflect the current state of medical knowledge regard-
ing AIDS, thereby serving to perpetuate misinformation about the disease." Id. Some
commentators posited that similar action on the part of other countries might gridlock interna-
tional travel. Id.
84. Medical Evaluation of Aliens (AIDS), 52 Fed. Reg. 21,532-33 (1987) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(1)).
85. Veitch, AIDS: A Killer That No Door Can Stop, Manchester Guardian Weekly, June
14, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
86. It is important to note that all these developments transpired around the same time
that the application period for IRCA legalization began.
87. 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 873-74 (1987).
88. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2 (1987).
89. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-71, 100 Stat. 391 (1987).
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amendment was sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms, who cited the grow-
ing number of AIDS cases worldwide as a reason to fear that immigra-
tion would catalyze the spread of the disease in the United States.90 The
Government, Helms contended, has an obligation to "protect its citizen-
ship from foreigners emigrating to this country who carry AIDS," 91 and
an HIV exclusion would go far toward providing the necessary
protection. 92
Despite Helms' rhetoric, the proposed amendment did not receive im-
mediate, unqualified acceptance. In fact, many Senators entertained it
with a significant amount of apprehension. Senator Danforth, for exam-
ple, stressed the need to better educate Congress on AIDS and the major
philosophical, political, and economic issues surrounding the disease
before engaging in any decisive legislative action.93 He expressed regret
that these questions were not properly analyzed in committee before be-
ing put to vote on the Senate floor,94 and opined that most Senators felt
the proposed amendment had been "thrust upon them." 95 Yet regardless
of the doubts expressed, debates foregone, and ignorance admitted, the
Senate voted unanimously to designate HIV as a "dangerous contagious
disease" under INA § 212(a)(6). The House accepted the proposed
amendment shortly thereafter,96 and on July 7, 1987, it was enacted into
law. 97
Pursuant to this enactment, HHS published a final rule substituting
HIV for AIDS on August 28, 1987. These guidelines mandated HIV
antibody testing for all applicants for permanent residence and refugee
admission over the age of fifteen. 98 Initially, there was some ambiguity
as to whether Congress intended the new HIV exclusion to apply to
aliens seeking legalization under IRCA. Alien advocacy groups hoped
for a very limited interpretation of the regulation that would effectively
90. 133 CONG. REc. S7410-11 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) ("[I]t is only elementary that as the
epidemic continues to grow and spread abroad, immigrants coming to this country in greater
numbers will be bringing the AIDS virus to the United States").
91. Id. at 7410.
92. Id. at 7410-11.
93. Id. at 7412-13.
94. "[T1he first three votes that we have had on the AIDS issue have been in the form of
amendments to appropriations bills.... This is not an issue that has enjoyed the analysis of
committees before coming to the Senate. It has not enjoyed forceful debate.... ." Id. at 7412.
95. Id. Senator Danforth articulated the prevalent sense of concern when he cautioned
that Congress was "going to go off half-cocked" in dealing with the issue. Id. at 7413.
96. The House adopted the Senate version of the amendment in joint conference, appar-
ently without objections or modifications. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1987, Pub, L.
No. 100-71, § 518, 101 Stat. 391, 475.
97. Id.
98. Under these rules, applicants under the age of 15 will be tested if there is reason to
believe they are infected. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,541 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)).
Vol. 15:162, 1990
Closing the Open Door
exempt amnesty applicants from its strict standards.99 During the
amendment vote, however, Senator Helms explicitly stated his intention
to apply the rule to IRCA,1°° and shortly after enactment it became evi-
dent that the INS would comply with Helms' plan.10 1 Consequently,
aliens seeking adjustment of status under IRCA are. subject to compul-
sory HIV antibody testing as part of their medical examination
requirement. 1 0 2
V. The HIV Exclusion Rationale as Applied to IRCA
A. The Impact of the Exclusion Rule on IRCA Legalization
Applicants
The HIV exclusion could apply to any of the approximately 3 million
aliens who have sought amnesty under IRCA.10 3 Those who applied for
legalization between December 1, 1987 and the May 4, 1988 cutoff date
had to submit to testing for the virus.104 Those who filed applications
earlier, and thus were not subject to the HIV exam at the outset, must
nevertheless undergo testing at the permanent residency stage.10 5 It is
difficult to determine the actual number of applicants who may be in-
fected with HIV. Conservative estimates place the total at approximately
1,200.106 Two factors, however, indicate that this number may be mark-
99. Telephone interview with Deborah Sanders, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights,
Washington, D.C. (January 5, 1989).
100. In his words,
[I]ndividuals who are illegally in the United States and who are applying for amnesty
under the recently passed "Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986" will be tested
as well. Under current law, they are required to undergo a medical exam and testing for
dangerous contagious diseases at the alien's expense. My amendment would simply add
to the existing list one more dangerous contagious disease.
133 CONG. Rc. S7411 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) (statement of Sen. Helms).
101. AIDS: The Legal Issues, supra note 76, at 239.
102. Id Since legalization applicants under IRCA are subject to the same medical exclu-
sions as applicants for permanent resident visas, members of this latter group are also required
to undergo HIV antibody testing as part of their compulsory medical examinations. 42 C.F.R.
§ 34.4 (1988).
103. Statistical Analysis Branch, Office of Plans and Analysis, Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, Washington, D.C., Provisional Legalization Application Statistics (Jan. 27,
1989).
104. Starr, The Ineffectiveness and Impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Exclusion in U.S. Immigration Law, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 87, 100 (1989).
105. INA § 245A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1522(b)(1)(C) (1986).
106. It is estimated that for every million Anglo-Americans, there will be about 150 cases
of HIV infection. Letter from J. Craig Fong, Managing Attorney and Public Relations Coor-
dinator, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, Los Angeles, California
to author (March 29, 1989) [hereinafter Fong letter]. With respect to Hispanics, the number is
approximately 400 per million. Id. The rate of infection among Asians is thought to be about
25 per million. Id Given these estimates, and the percentage of the total volume of amnesty
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edly under-inclusive.10 7 First, the adoption of the HIV exclusion provi-
sion may have prompted many aliens who suspected that they were
infected not to file for amnesty, or to drop out of sight before the applica-
tion process was complete.10 8 Second, a significant number of aliens who
knew they were high risk for HIV may have filed their applications
before the exclusionary provision went into effect.109 This possibility
suggests that the number of identifiable HIV-positives will increase sub-
stantially after the second medical examination at the permanent resi-
dency stage.' 10 In sum, then, it appears that the HIV exclusion will have
a profound effect on a significant number of applicants.
B. The Compelling Public Health Justifications for the Exclusion Rule
The purpose of listing HIV infection as an excludable health condition
is to prevent the importation of HIV into and the further spread of AIDS
within the United States."' That these are laudable objectives cannot be
denied. AIDS is one of the most serious threats to public health that
exists today.112 As of March, 1988, over 88,000 cases had been reported
in this country, 13 and it is estimated that at least one million more peo-
ple have been exposed to HIV. 114 Furthermore, the number of AIDS
applications that these ethnic groups comprise, it is suspected that there are at least 1000 to
1200 cases of HIV exposure among the 3 million legalization applications filed. Id.
107. "It is a safe bet that underreporting is far more widespread in the undocumented
population than in the population at large." Id.
108. C. Kamasaki, National Council of La Raza, Memorandum to National Coordinating
Agencies and Interested Persons Regarding AIDS Testing and Legalization 3 (June 22, 1987)
[hereinafter Kamasaki Memo]; Note, The Impact of AIDS on Immigration Law: Unresolved
Issues, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 223, 242 n.128 (1988).
109. Telephone interview with Pat Dunn, Pro Bono Legalization Coordinator for the Bar
Association of San Francisco and Chairperson for the HIV Task Force of the San Francisco
Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services (Jan. 10, 1989).
110. Id.
111. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,541 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2). See also 133 CONG.
REC. 7410-11 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) (statement of Sen. Helms).
112. Statement by Dr. Jonathan Mann, World Health Organization, reprinted in AIDS
and Africa, 2 LANCET 1348 (1986).
113. CENTERS FOR DIsEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., Mar. 1989, at
9; Letter from the AFL-CIO, Alien Rights Project of the Washington Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, ACLU, American Council for Nationalities Service, AILA, Church
World Service, Farmworkers Justice Fund, International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
League of United Latin American Citizens, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, Mex-
ican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees,
National Council of La Raza, and Presiding Bishops Fund for World Relief - the Episcopal
Church, to Dr. Lawrence Farer, Centers for Disease Control, regarding Public Health Service
Proposed Rule 42 C.F.R. § 34 (August 7, 1987) [hereinafter Letter to Farer].
114. Letter to Farer, supra note 113.
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cases is expected to rise geometrically in the coming years. 115 Hence,
there are compelling grounds for adopting measures to control the spread
of the epidemic.
The exclusion rule can be viewed as one such measure." 6 United
States immigration policy has long been employed as a mechanism for
combatting the proliferation of disease, and in this context the practice of
excluding aliens who are afflicted with certain contagious diseases has
been widely accepted. 1 7 The HIV exclusion is consistent with this tradi-
tion. The methods utilized by the rule comport with previously accepted
procedures to detect and exclude aliens with serious illnesses." 8 More-
over, "[t]he spread of HIV by certain high risk sexual practices is not
unlike the transmission of syphilis and other diseases"11 9 currently listed
under INA § 212(b)(6). Thus, both the gravity of the AIDS problem
and the pattern of historical practice justify the expansion of the medical
exclusion category to include HIV. 20
C. The Conflict Between the Exclusion Rule and IRCA's Legalization
Rationale: Will Waivers Solve the Problem?
While the public health concerns embodied in the HIV exclusion are
indisputable, the rule threatens to produce an effect which may detract
substantially from its desirability. The exclusion will reduce the number
of aliens eligible for amnesty under IRCA, a result which appears incon-
sistent with the humanitarian objectives of legalization: (1) granting for-
mal recognition to "those aliens . . . who have contributed for years
toward our economic and social well being,"' 2' and (2) awarding this
recognition in a "liberal and generous fashion."' 122
Yet despite this apparent conflict, and the potentially restrictive im-
pact of the HIV exclusion, Congress claims to have remained faithful to
the humanitarian goals of IRCA, providing for the equitable treatment of
115. See Gostin & Curran, Legal Control Measures for AIDS: Reporting Requirements,
Surveillance, Quarantine, and Regulation of Public Meeting Places, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
214 (1987).
116. Other options available to combat AIDS include public education, voluntary or
mandatory testing programs, and quarantine. See Note, Preserving the Public Health: A Propo-
sal to Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 441, 470-78 (1988).
117. See Comment, supra note 46, at 133. For a discussion of the history of United States
immigration exclusions on grounds of medical disability, see Note, supra note 108, at 224-28
(1988).
118. See Comment, supra note 46, at 129-33.
119. Medical Examination of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,541 (1987) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 34.2(b)).
120. See Comment, supra note 46, at 133.
121. 132 CONG. REC. H10584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Peter Rodino).
122. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 27, at 72.
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all HIV applicants through the availability of a waiver.' 23 Under INA
§ 245A(d)(2)(B)(i), a condition of inadmissibility may be waived at the
discretion of the Attorney General on the basis of "humanitarian pur-
poses, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public inter-
est." 124 Congress 125 has indicated its intent that such waivers be liberally
granted, 126 and although the HIV exclusion went into effect after IRCA
was enacted, it appears that the legislature, or at least one committee,
sought to maintain this liberal position with respect to the new rule. 127
Amnesty applicants thus technically enjoy the possibility of a waiver of
the HIV exclusion. In reality, however, it appears highly unlikely that
many will benefit from this measure.128 In addition to the three condi-
tions for waiver enumerated under IRCA itself,129 the INS has estab-
lished a second set of procedures for adjudicating the appeals of HIV
excludables:
[T]he discretionary authority of the Attorney General will not be used un-
less the applicant can establish that (1) the danger to the public health of
the United States created by the alien's admission is minimal, (2) the possi-
bility of the spread of the infection created by the alien's admission to the
United States is minimal, and (3) there will be no cost incurred by any level
of government agency of the United States without prior consent of that
agency. 130
In order to qualify for a waiver, therefore, an applicant must first satisfy
at least one of the statutory requirements set forth in IRCA, and then
overcome a second layer of review contained in the INS guidelines.' 3'
123. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
124. INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(i), § 210(c)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
125. Note the qualification of the use of the word "Congress," discussed supra note 27.
126. As the House Judiciary Committee stated:
The Committee expects the Attorney General to examine the legalization applications in
which there is a waivable ground of exclusion carefully, but sympathetically. The Com-
mittee's intent is that legalization should be implemented in a liberal and generous fash-
ion, as has been the historical pattern with other forms of administrative relief granted by
the Congress. In most cases, denials of legaliation... should only occur... within the
specified non-waivable grounds of exclusion.
H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 69-70 (1983) (emphasis added).
127. The House Judiciary Committee observed that "[tihe Attorney General should con-
sider issuing waivers of that ground of inadmissibility or exclusion in cases of infection with
the AIDS virus for persons who arrived in the United States and established residence by
January 1, 1982." H.R. REP. No. 28, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 37-38 (1987).
128. See Starr, supra note 104, at 102-04.
129. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
130. Cable from James A. Puleo, INS Assistant Commissioner for Examinations, to INS
Regional Offices (March 2, 1988), reprinted in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 239 (1988) [herein-
after Cable].
131. Telephone interview with Joe D. Cuddihy, Senior Immigration Examiner, INS (Jan.
11, 1989) [hereinafter Cuddihy interview].
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This process has been described as effectively nullifying the opportu-
nity for obtaining waivers in any significant number. 132 It will be ex-
tremely difficult, for example, for an individual to demonstrate that he
will neither endanger the public health nor foster the spread of the dis-
ease absent detailed discussion and surveillance of his activities. 133 In
addition, since the estimated cost of medical treatment for individuals
whose HIV infection develops into AIDS is approximately $50,000 per
year, it is unlikely that the majority of amnesty applicants will have suffi-
cient health insurance or funds to render reliance on a government
agency unnecessary. 34 Therefore, waivers will actually be available only
in a few isolated and highly aberrant instances. 135 Some argue that the
combination of the IRCA conditions, the INS guidelines, and the discre-
tionary nature of review simply makes it too difficult for anyone to qual-
ify. 136 This assertion appears to be valid, given that the INS has granted,
at most, five waivers 1 37 out of an estimated thirty-five to fifty applica-
tions.1 38  Regardless of the availability of the waiver provision, then,
there is a significant amount of evidence to suggest that the HIV exclu-
sion will frustrate the liberal objectives of IRCA legalization.
VI. Arguments Against the Exclusion of HIV-Positive Legalization
Applicants
IRCA legalization was intended in large part to accord legitimate sta-
tus to a "shadow population" deemed worthy of legal protection by vir-
132. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 104, at 102-04.
133. Loue, Representing HIV-Positive Clients, 11 IMMIGR. J. 10, 11 (1988).
134. Id. See also Futureshock, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 30 (examining enormous
growth of AIDS in general population).
135. Indeed, of the few cases where the INS has granted waivers, all of the applicants had
private health insurance, a luxury uncommon among those eligible for amnesty. Telephone
interview with Pat Dunn, supra note 109.
136. See, e.g., Loue, supra note 133, at 11.
137. INS guidelines require all HIV waiver requests to be transferred from the regional
offices to the Deputy Commissioner in Washington, D.C. for final certification. See Cable,
supra note 130. As of the time this Comment was written, the Deputy Commissioner's office
claimed not to have received any applications for review. Cuddihy interview, supra note 131.
See also Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epi-
demic, June 24, 1988, at 156 (presents current United States policy and recommendations
regarding testing of refugees for HIV virus and treatment of those testing positive). Thus,
those waivers that have reportedly been granted must have been adjudicated by the regional
offices acting beyond the purview of their prescribed authority. Cuddihy interview, supra note
131.
138. It is unclear how many waiver applications have actually been filed. The statistics
cited in the text have been developed from conversations with representatives of public assist-
ance groups that are working on waiver cases. The estimates may be conservative, however,
since they do not take into account the possibility that a number of aliens have filed waiver
requests through private counsel.
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tue of their social and economic contributions. 139 To effectuate this
policy, Congress140 expressed its desire that the amnesty program be im-
plemented flexibly, in order to encourage maximum participation. 141 In
light of this rationale, the following sections demonstrate that it is both
incongruous and unfair to deny adjustment of status to HIV-positive
aliens.
A. Humanitarian Concerns
The amnesty provision is grounded in the notion that "the legalization
program is to be implemented in a liberal and generous fashion. ' 142 The
adoption of the HIV exclusion, however, will undermine these equitable
designs with respect to infected applicants. One argument supporting
this conclusion - that the INS has in effect denied access to the waiver
mechanism - has already been introduced. 143 But there is still other
evidence to sustain this view. For example, given the long incubation
period of the virus, and the six-year minimum residence requirement for
amnesty eligibility, it is very likely that most HIV-positive applicants
contracted the infection in the United States. 144 This probability sug-
gests that the Government's commitment to these individuals should be
strengthened beyond its already professed intent to acknowledge their
social and economic contributions. *The fact that aliens who are demon-
strably worthy recipients of temporary legal residence have been exposed
to a potentially fatal disease on American soil adds moral content to, and
further solidifies, their relationship to this country. Yet by instituting the
HIV exclusion, the Government has chosen to absolve itself of all re-
sponsibility, moral or otherwise, that it purported to assume through le-
galization. A condition which should logically reinforce the case for
granting amnesty has in effect become the pretext for denying it.
A related example of the HIV exclusion's destructive effect on the eq-
uitable underpinnings of legalization involves the consequences of depor-
tation. The confidentiality provisions of IRCA prohibit the INS from
initiating deportation proceedings against an amnesty applicant based on
the information he or she has divulged during the course of the pro-
139. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 27.
141. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
142. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5676. See also Mazzoli, supra note 6, at 49 ("Congress intended that the INS
be generous and humane in its interpretation of the legalization requirements in order to en-
sure the highest level of participation in the program.").
143. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
144. "[T]he overwhelming majority of immigrants with AIDS contracted the disease in the
United States." Kamasaki memo, supra note 108, at 3. See also Starr, supra note 104, at 101.
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cess. 145 Nevertheless, a rejected applicant, like an individual who de-
clines to pursue legalization in the first place, remains undocumented and
therefore deportable. 146 The HIV exclusion will thus force a number of
aliens to return to their countries of origin, where they may be subjected
to substandard medical care and various forms of discrimination. 147
Furthermore, some countries may go so far as to refuse to readmit their
own infected citizens. 148 Hence, the potential consequences of expulsion
reinforce the notion that the HIV exclusion is an affront to the humanita-
145. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
146. Fodiman, Non-U.S. Citizens, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCA-
TIONAL GUIDE (1988).
147. Most legalization applicants come from developing nations, primarily from Mexico
(approximately 70%) and El Salvador (8%). Starr, supra note 104, at 102 n.94. These nations
may have only a fraction of the resources that the United States has available to cope with
AIDS. Id. at 106-08. This was the conclusion of the Panos Institute, an international infor-
mation and policy studies organization that developed its estimates by comparing the number
of reported AIDS cases in a given country to its national per capita income. R. SABATIER,
BLAMING OTHERS 14-15 (1988). The disparity between the United States and these countries
may be even greater than the Institute suspects. Given that most underdeveloped countries do
not have adequate systems of diagnosis and surveillance in operation, the number of unre-
ported cases is likely to be very high, thus diminishing the amount of money per victim that a
country can allocate to combat AIDS. The exclusion rule will therefore banish a substantial
number of HIV-positive applicants to homelands that are ill-equipped to provide the kind of
counseling, treatment, and experimental programs that they would have access to were they
permitted to remain in this country. Starr, supra note 104, at 106-08.
In addition, these individuals, once expelled, may be dealt with harshly. In many countries,
a pervasive sense of ignorance and hysteria regarding AIDS has translated into hostile, often
abusive policies. Id. at 106-07; R. SABATIER, supra, at 118. For example, in Cuba, seroposi-
tive individuals are quarantined. Id. In West Germany, the state of Bavaria has authorized its
police to detain for examination anyone suspected of carrying the AIDS virus. The Aids Cops
Are Coming, TIME, March 9, 1987, at 55. Less harsh forms of persecution include diminished
job opportunities, social ostracism, and withholding government and health benefits. Starr,
supra note 104, at 106 n.123.
In identifying the hostile and discriminatory positions toward AIDS and HIV victims that
other countries have assumed, I do not mean to imply that these individuals will escape similai
treatment in this country. On the contrary, AIDS sufferers have been the objects of prejudice
and abuse in the United States since the disease was first diagnosed. Widespread educational
campaigns and advances in clinical knowledge, however, are working to raise the level of col-
lective consciousness in this country respecting the disease. This trend suggests that the inci-
dence of discrimination is decreasing. Comparatively speaking, then, HIV positives in the
United States are much less likely to encounter the kind of overt abuse, or indeed even the less
obvious forms of discrimination, that are standard practice in other countries.
148. Several countries have implemented programs to screen some categories of foreigners
for HIV as a condition for obtaining entry. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. There-
fore, it might not be unreasonable to assume that some of these countries would apply such
exclusionary policies to their own citizens, particularly those who have resided abroad for a
period long enough to suggest that they did not contract the HIV infection at home.
Senator Simpson flagged this as a potential problem, noting the additional complications it
presents:
[D]o you exclude them and deport them to a country that will not take them? Then what
are we talking about? Leaving them here illegally in a status with a communicable dis-
ease? That is a possibility. Or, are you talking about detention or areas where they will be
kept quarantined? That is really where we are headed here.
133 CONG. REC. 57415 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
Yale Journal of International Law
rian concerns of IRCA. The inequity associated with excluding an am-
nesty applicant who contracted a potentially deadly disease while in the
United States should be obvious. The prospect that this exclusion might
relegate some applicants to inadequate medical care and persecution,
moreover, approaches unconscionability.
B. Testing for HIV" Infection Will Undermine the Successful
Implementation of the Legalization Program
The HIV exclusion will undermine the ability to maximize the regular-
ization of eligible applicants by driving large numbers of potential appli-
cants underground. Generally speaking, the target population for
amnesty consists of less educated, often minimally literate people, many
of whom have fled political oppression in their home countries, or who
have been exploited by employers and other authority figures. 149 All
have lived in fear of detection and deportation by the INS.' 50 In short,
this population characteristically suspects any governmental initiatives,
institutions, or associations.
Congress attempted to allay this suspicion and thus encourage maxi-
mum participation in the amnesty program by incorporating the confi-
dentiality provision, designed to protect all information contained in the
application.151 The introduction of the HIV testing requirement, how-
ever, is likely to exacerbate the fears of a great many eligible aliens, and
deter them from applying.15 2 This will particularly be the case with cer-
tain foreign nationals such as Haitians and central Africans, who are per-
ceived as being at high risk for HIV exposure.'5 3 Moreover, those who
are in fact infected with HIV will" not receive the benefits of education
and counseling, and will therefore be more likely to transmit the virus. 154
In this light, then, the HIV exclusion could conceivably increase the
proliferation of AIDS and HIV in this country. 155
149. H.R. REP. No. 682(), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653. See Stine, supra note 25, at 642.
150. H.R. REP. No. 682(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
151. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
152. W. CURRAN, L. GOSTIN, & M. CLARK, AIDS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY POLICY
285 (1988).
153. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)).
154. W. CURRAN, L. GOSTIN, & M. CLARK, supra note 152, at 285.
155. See Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 7.
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C. Additional Arguments
1. Negligible Public Health Benefits
The addition of HIV as an excludable "dangerous contagious disease,"
and the application of HIV-testing requirements to the legalization provi-
sion of IRCA, will do little to slow the progress of the disease in this
country. This conclusion is supported by three contentions. First, it is
doubtful that the testing of amnesty applicants will have any significant
impact on the volume of HIV exposures in the United States. As of the
date of this writing, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") estimated
that between 1 and 1.5 million Americans have been exposed to HIV.156
The target population eligible for legalization under IRCA, on the other
hand, is approximately 3.9 million. 157 Thus, only a minute fraction' 58 of
the total number of HIV exposures in the United States are likely to
come from prospective amnesty applicants.1 59
Second, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that legalization ap-
plicants have a higher prevalence of HIV exposure than the general pop-
ulation. 160 At worst, their rates of infection are likely to be similar to
those of legal residents.161 Indeed, in many of their native countries, the
exposure rates are reportedly far lower than in the United States. 162 The
HIV-testing requirement thus targets a population not known to be at a
higher risk than other groups residing in this country.
Finally, the compelling public health goals of the HIV exclusion are
undermined in light of the fact that the testing requirements are not ap-
plicable to all foreigners seeking entry into the United States.1 63 Gener-
ally speaking, all aliens applying for nonimmigrant visas are exempt from
HIV examination, as are aliens below the age of fifteen. 164 HIV carriers
156. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., March 1989.
157. Id
158. 0.58%.
159. Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 7.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
162. The documented rates of infection in certain Asian and Hispanic nations, for exam-
ple, are far below that of the United States. Fong letter, supra note 106. This observation does
not apply to applicants from Haiti and certain African nations, however, where the rates of
exposure are significantly higher.
163. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,544 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.4).
164. Id. The nonimmigrant visa exemptions are ironic given the intent underlying IRCA
legalization. Few aliens eligible for nonimmigrant'status have contributed to the welfare of the
nation to the extent that amnesty applicants have. Yet despite their more tenuous relationship
to the United States, these individuals are subject to requirements for legal admission that are
substantially less stringent.
The INS has indicated that it will subject nonimmigrants to testing if they appear to be ill.
Federal Government Seeks to Bar Entry ofAliens Who Have AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986,
at Al, col. 1. Similarly, the PHS noted in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that "if there is
reason to suspect that an [amnesty] applicant under age fifteen could be infected," he may be
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who apply for admission under these categories can therefore enter the
country and engage in practices that will spread the virus.165 Thus,
although some HIV-positives may be excluded under IRCA, many
others (indeed, perhaps more) will be admitted through other avenues of
legal entry.166 Because it is based on irrational distinctions and imposed
in an inconsistent manner, the HIV exclusion will do little to arrest the
AIDS epidemic in this country. 167
2. Reliability and Accuracy in HIV Testing
Another problem associated with the exclusion rule is that it depends
too heavily on the accuracy and reliability of HIV examination tech-
niques and protocol, none of which can be guaranteed at present.1 68 The
most common methods of testing for the presence of HIV antibodies are
the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA),169 and the more ex-
pensive, more accurate Western blot. 170 According to the PHS, a legali-
zation applicant is considered seropositive only after two ELISAs and a
confirmatory Western blot indicating that he is infected with HIV.' 71
This procedure has been found to be extremely sensitive and detective
required to take a blood test. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,543 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 34.2). Nevertheless, given that an individual can be an HIV carrier for years before mani-
festing any symptoms of the virus, it is unlikely that such qualifying policies will have any
impact on the number of infected people who enter the country under these classifications.
165. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that some nonimmigrants can remain in the
United States for extended periods of time. For example, an L-1 intracompany transferee visa
recipient may be admitted for three years, with additional extensions of two or three years
available. A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL RAY & C. BELL, 1988 IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HAND-
BOOK 263 (1988). Students may be allowed to stay in the United States for up to eight years.
Id. at 60. Investors can remain almost indefinitely. Id. at 177-78. An HIV carrier who falls
under one of these headings, therefore, can pose as significant a threat of spreading the virus as
can a legalization applicant. Furthermore, since these individuals will go undetected, and as
such will not be subjected to any kind of compulsory counseling, their destructive potential
may be markedly greater.
166. Note, supra note 108, at 241-42, 248.
167. Id.
168. Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 7.
169. The ELISA test involves placing HIV proteins on plastic beads and adding a blood
sample. If the blood contains HIV antibodies, they will combine with the proteins and the
beads will change color. Testing of Blood for AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1988, at B2,
col. 6. This test was designed for screening large programs such as donations to blood banks
and hospitals. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, & the
Burden of Proof, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 260 (1986).
170. Kamasaki memo, supra note 108, at 2; Loue, supra note 133, at 10. A Western blot is
performed by passing an electric current through a gel containing HIV proteins, which arrange
themselves at different heights on the gel. The proteins are blotted from the gel onto a special
paper and combined with a blood sample. If the paper changes color, HIV antibodies are
present in the blood. Testing of Blood for AIDS Virus, supra note 169. The Western blot
procedure is very expensive, and is not designed for large-scale screening programs. Barry,
Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 169, at 262.
171. Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 7.
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when applied to populations with high rates of exposure. 172 When ap-
plied to populations with low rates of exposure, however, such as the
group applying for amnesty under IRCA, it can yield large numbers of
"false positives" 173 and "false negatives," 174 and thus is of questionable
validity.175
The predictive value of the HIV test (i.e., the percentage of true posi-
tives among all positives, and the percentage of true negatives among all
negatives) depends on the prevalence of the virus among the target popu-
lation. 176 In other words, the greater the proliferation of HIV exposure
among a given class of examination subjects, the greater the likelihood
that a positive antibody test result is in fact a "true positive." 177 Section
212(a)(6) as applied to IRCA requires the testing of a large population
that is generally at low risk of infection. 178 Consequently, a number of
false positives and false negatives can be expected among the pool of le-
galization applicants. 179 According to the CDC, which helped draft the
alien testing regulations, the three-tiered testing procedure mandated by
the PHS will reduce the threat of such inaccuracies to a negligible
level. 180 Other experts are much less confident about this assumption.181
One study estimates that in low-risk populations the use of the three-test
protocol will produce, for every twenty-eight true positives, eleven false
positives and two false negatives, or an error rate of approximately
twenty-eight percent. 182
The threat of obtaining a significant number of false positives and false
negatives has serious implications that can be brought to bear on all of
the arguments against the HIV exclusion outlined in this Comment. For
instance, a high rate of false positives will undercut the humanitarian
goals of legalization by unfairly denying adjustment of status to some
individuals due to a health condition that they do not possess. 18 3 It will
also diminish the success of the legalization program by creating incen-
172. Id.
173. A "false positive" reaction occurs when an individual who has never been exposed to
the AIDS virus nevertheless tests positive for the presence of HIV antibodies. AIDS: The
Legal Issues, supra note 76, at 82.
174. A "false negative" occurs when an individual is infected with HIV, but his initial test
indicates otherwise. AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 68, at 132.
175. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 169, at 263.
176. W. CURRAN, L. GOSTIN & M. CLARK, supra note 152, at 262; Loue, supra note 133,
at 10; Selwyn, AIDS: What Is Now Known, 21 Hose. PRAc. 127, 144 (1986).
177. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 169, at 263.
178. Id.
179. See Gostin, supra note 52, at 4.
180. Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 11.
181. See, eg., Levine & Bayer, Screening Blood: Public Health and Medical Uncertainty,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8, 9 (1985).
182. Barry, Cleary, & Fineberg, supra note 169, at 263.
183. Letter to Farer, supra note 113, at 7.
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tives for these individuals to abandon the application process and seek
refuge in the anonymity of undocumented status. 184 At the other end of
the spectrum, a high rate of false negatives will dilute the public health
benefits associated with the HIV exclusion by allowing infected appli-
cants to enter or remain in the United States based on erroneous test
results.18 5 Thus, the technical limitations of testing methods may exacer-
bate other problems that the HIV exclusion creates. This prospect in
turn supports the notion that the exclusion rule is antithetical to the in-
tent underlying amnesty.
3. Foreign Policy Considerations
The final argument against the HIV exclusion occurs in the foreign
policy context. The need for global cooperation in the fight against
AIDS has been stressed by the World Health Organization ("WHO"), 186
the agency that has undertaken the task of coordinating the global cam-
paign against the disease. In addition, education has been identified by
WHO and other expert interests as the most efficacious method of arrest-
ing the epidemic. 187 WHO regards the dissemination of information on
the transmission of HIV as key to arresting the further spread of the
virus.' 8 8 Accordingly, the agency maintains that information regarding
sexual practices which minimize the spread of HIV must be clearly and
effectively communicated to the general population, and especially to
members of high-risk groups. 8 9
WHO's approach has been espoused in lieu of compulsory testing,
which has been denigrated as a waste of resources better allocated for
education, research, and surveillance. 90 The agency has cautioned that
screening efforts may be prompted by a misunderstanding of the "casual
184. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
185. Starr, supra note 104, at 92-96.
186. See Mann, Worldwide Strategies for HIV Control: WHO'S Special Programme on
AIDS, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 290 (1986). For a history of the founding of WHO,
see Note, The AIDS Pandemic: International Travel and Immigration Restrictions and the
World Health Organization's Response, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1044, 1048-51 (1988).
187. Cleary, Education and the Prevention of AIDS, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 267
(1988); Gostin, supra note 52, at 8-11; Nelson, International Travel Restrictions and the AIDS
Epidemic, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 231 n.4 (1987); Note, supra note 186, at 1052 n.55. Indeed,
prior to the adoption of the HIV exclusion the PHS itself stressed education over other alterna-
tive measures in its domestic strategy for coping with the disease. Id.
188. Note, supra note 186, at 1052 n.55.
189. Id.
190. See Consultation on International Travel Restrictions and Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV), 62 WHO WEEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 77 (1987). This position has been
echoed by members of the scientific and academic communities. See,.e.g., Chen, The AIDS
Pandemic: An Internationalist Approach to Disease Control, 116 DAEDALUS 181, 190 (1987);
Cleary, supra note 187, at 270-71; Lange & Dax, HIV Infection and International Travel, 36
AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 197 (1987); Veitch, supra note 85, at 8.
186
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transmission" of HIV, or by the need to evince active concern over the
control and prevention of AIDS.191 Indeed, Dr. Jonathan Mann, the Di-
rector of WHO's Special Programme on AIDS, sharply criticized the use
of restrictive measures such as mandatory testing, stating that the AIDS
hysteria threatened free travel between countries as well as international
exchange and communication. 192
WHO's efforts to combat the spread of AIDS, and particularly its em-
phasis on education, have received widespread endorsement in the inter-
national community. 193  Yet, notwithstanding this support, the
magnitude of the AIDS epidemic has led many nations to reject the
agency's position and institute compulsory testing programs for aliens. 194
By adopting a position that favors HIV testing rather than education,
therefore, the United States joins these states in repudiating WHO's at-
tempts to develop a cohesive, multinational solution to the AIDS prob-
lem.195 Given the United States sphere of influence as a world power,
moreover, its impact on these global initiatives may be especially acute.
Other countries may be prompted by its example to enact similar policies
requiring HIV screening of immigrants and nonimmigrants. 196 Hence,
the HIV exclusion will perpetuate, if not augment, a recent trend among
an increasing number of nations to abandon any collaborative efforts to
191." WHO, WHO Report of Meeting on Criteria for AIDS Screening 1 (May 1987).
192. Altman, Key World Health Official Warns of Epidemic of Prejudice on AIDS, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
193. See Note, supra note 186, at 1056-57. In October, 1987, the United Nations General
Assembly passed a resolution supporting WHO's global AIDS policy. Prevention and control
of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 19, U.N.
Doc. A/42/49 (1988). The resolution stated that the UN: "Commends the World Health
Organization for its efforts towards global AIDS prevention and control and... [c]onfirms
that the World Health Organization should continue to direct and co-ordinate the urgent
global battle against AIDS." Id
The European Communities Council also applauded WHO's position in its Conclusions
concerning AIDS. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States, Meeting with the Council of 15 May 1987 concerning AIDS, 30 0.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. C 178) 1 (1987). Among other issues, the EC Council focused on "the ineffective-
ness, in terms of prevention, of any policy of systematic and compulsory screening." Id. In
addition, the London Declaration on AIDS Prevention called for the implementation of
WHO's global AIDS strategy, noting that the "single most important component of national
AIDS programmes is information and education." World Summit of Ministers of Health Is-
sues, London Declaration on AIDS Prevention, reprinted in WHO Press Release, WHO/LUN
4, at 1 (Jan. 28, 1988).
194. A number of countries have enacted laws conditioning entry on HIV status, including'
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, India, Iraq, Ku-
wait, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Syria, Thailand,
and the United Arab Emirates. AIDS: The Legal Issues, supra note 76, at 247; R. SABATIER,
supra note 147, at 118-20.
195. See Note, supra note 186, at 1052.
196. AIDS: The Legal Issues, supra note 76, at 247.
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combat AIDS. 197 In this respect, the rule may have "inhumane" implica-
tions that extend far beyond the scope of IRCA's legalization rationale.
VII. Conclusion
As he signed IRCA into law, President Reagan proudly forecast that
the landmark legislation would "go far to improve the lives of a class of
individuals who now must hide in the shadows." 198 In so doing, he ar-
ticulated the importance of the humanitarian concerns that are encapsu-
lated in the amnesty provision. Indeed, these concerns have been widely
recognized by Congress' 99 and the Executive Branch 2°° as an indispensa-
ble element of a revised immigration policy, and their pursuit touted as
one of the primary objectives underlying the Act. Unfortunately, the
adoption of the HIV exclusion and its subsequent application to IRCA
will have a detrimental impact on the humanitarian focus of legalization.
Perhaps this impact can be tolerated, given the compelling public health
interests requiring decisive measures to arrest the spread of HIV. Yet
upon closer examination, it appears that the exclusion rule is not an ap-
propriate solution. The rule will prove ineffective in combatting the
proliferation of the disease, and may in fact produce effects which sustain
or even enhance the growth of the epidemic.
Congressman Mazzoli, who played an instrumental role in the enact-
ment of IRCA, recognized that the Act would encounter some difficul-
ties. "[S]nags, glitches, and snafus," he stated, "[were] inevitable given
the landmark nature of this legislation. ' 20 1 Mazzoli went on to discount
the gravity of these potential problems, however: "[IRCA] is not perfect.
Its implementation will not be perfect either. But a commitment by all to
work toward the fair, humane, and effective implementation of the stat-
ute will erase most of these imperfections. '20 2
Obviously, Mazzoli did not anticipate the irreconcilable contradictions
that would arise with the incorporation of the HIV exclusion into the
legalization scheme. Indeed, given the social and political exigencies
which prompted the rapid adoption of the exclusion rule, it appears that
everyone involved grossly underestimated the impact of this particular
"snafu." In this light, Congress should reopen the inquiry regarding the
HIV exclusion, and reevaluate the rule in view of the evidence and argu-
197. See Note, supra note 186, at 1052-1055, 1057.
198. N. MONTWEILER, supra note 11, at 539.
199. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 23.
201. Mazzoli, supra note 6, at 51.
202. Id. at 52.
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ments against it. An examinationof this sort can yield only one conclu-
sion: regardless of whether the exclusion rule has merit as applied to new
immigrants, principles of equity and expediency warrant an exemption
for IRCA legalization applicants.
